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Introduction 
The 2007-2008 started in US but soon affected other countries causing huge losses of 
economic output and financial wealth. It was associated with losses and failures of financial 
companies that made regulators rethink capital adequacy requirements for banks to reduce the 
fragility of global financial system. 
New banking regulations adopted worldwide require banks to increase capitalization, 
introduce minimum liquidity requirements and aim to switch from bail-out to bail-in. In order to 
comply with Basel III banks need to hold 8.5% in reliable assets (Tier 1 ratio) instead of 4% 
under Basel II. This significant increase in capital requirements caused a heated discussion 
between regulators and bankers concerning effects of its adoption for the economy. Regulators 
believe that current leverage level is excessive and can be reduced to create more stable financial 
system without negative effect on the economy
1
. At the end of 2014 tangible equity ratio was 
only 4.97% in US and 3.86% in other countries (for global systemically important banks)
2
, while 
average tier 1 capital ratio was above 12%. These numbers suggest that even with the switch to 
stricter capital requirements there is still a room for improvement. At the same time bankers 
point out that increase in funding costs after new regulations are adopted is imminent as equity 
financing is expensive compared to debt. This increase, if happens, would lead to lending rates 
growth, decline in lending activities and impair economic growth. 
To determine the actual effect of capital regulations on lending activities and justify 
either of expressed opinions the impact of capital ratio increase on cost of equity and total cost of 
capital should be quantified. Financial theory says that source of financing have no impact on 
company’s value and funding costs in absence of frictions. This result is known as Modigliani-
Miller irrelevance theorem Weather banks can be considered as normal “firms” or due to their 
specific nature Modigliani-Miller theorem cannot be applied is a question we need to answer.  
In this paper we empirically examine link between bank capital adequacy ratio and cost 
of capital for 21 largest US, Eurozone and UK banks. We provide quantitative comparison of 
leverage impact on cost of capital among sample countries and quantify impact of liquidity risk 
and efficiency ratio on costs. We also discuss history of Basel committee and details of Basel III 
capital regulations and focus on theoretical aspects of MM theorem applicability to financial 
companies.  
                                                          
1 Financial Times. (Nov. 9, 2010) Healthy banking system is a goal, not profitable banks. [Online] Available from: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63fa6b9e-eb8e-11df-bbb5-00144feab49a.html [Accessed: 5th May 2015] 
2 FDIC Global Capital Index as of December 31, 2014. [Online] Available from: 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/capitalizationratios4q14.pdf [Accessed: 1st May 2015] 
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Chapter 1. Basel accords 
History of Basel accords 
Breakdown of Bretton Woods system was followed by a disturbances in currency and 
banking markets. German Bankhaus Herstatt’s bank failed in 1974 triggering losses for banks 
around the world on their trade with Herstatt. Following these events G-10 decided to establish a 
new supervisory authority later named Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The 
committee aims to establish financial stability, regulate international cooperation on banking 
supervision and improve supervision quality. Nowadays committee includes 27 member 
countries and European Union. 
Until 1980s banking regulation and supervision was relatively simple. At the beginning 
of 1980s Latin America countries, extensively financed by banks borrowings, were no longer 
able to service their debt of $327 billion. As a result of Mexican insolvency in 1982 and 
followed defaults of other Latin America countries, international banks stopped oversees 
lending. These events raised concerns about deterioration of banks capital ratios and increased 
fragility of new financial system. Recognizing the need to harmonize capital requirements and 
enhance resilience of financial system to crisis Basel Committee issued first Basel Capital 
Accord in 1988. Basel I became the first international capital regulation initiative. It introduced 
weighted approach to risk measurement by categorizing assets into 5 categories, with risk 
weighting of 0%, 20%, 50%, 100% and assets that were fully deducted from capital. It also 
introduced notion of Tier 1 capital, which included loss absorbing equities and hybrid 
instruments. Banks were required to have a minimum capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 8% 
of which 4% should be Tier 1 Capital. It was a simple framework to present banks’ balance 
sheet, but as Andrew Bailey mentioned in his speech at Bloomberg (Bailey, 2014) it did not 
provide enough insights into risk management and created incentive to increase average riskiness 
of banks assets. 
Basel I evolved into Basel II, which was published in 2004, but fully implemented only in 
2007. It introduced three new pillars of capital management: 
1. Minimum capital requirements that should, apart from credit risk, take into account 
operational and market risks; 
2. Key principles of supervisory review and risk management guidance enebling 
supervisors to set additional capital requirements on firm-by-firm basis; 
3. Disclosure requirements as an instrument to develop market discipline and increase 
transparency of the information. 
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Basel II did not introduce new definitions of capital or new levels of capital requirements. 
By implementing mentioned above pillars it extended banks’ ability to use proprietary models of 
market risk capital requirements first introduced in 1996 and known as Market Risk 
Amendment. It is important to note that neither Basel I nor Basel II did not place limits on 
leverage in addition to risk-based requirements. 
Unfortunately Basel II was not sufficient to protect financial system from the crisis. With 
collapse of Lehman Brother, bailout of Bear Stearns and turmoil in global financial markets 
excessive banks leverage again compelled attention of regulators once again.  
In response to the financial crisis the Basel Committee designed another reformed 
referred as Basel III. It changes definition of Tier 1 capital making Common Equity Tier 1 
(common equity and retained earnings) the predominant form of Tier 1 capital. By 2019 banks 
should have minimum ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 capital of 4.5% (excluding additional 
buffers). Basel III aims not only to generally heighten capital requirements, but also to introduce 
liquidity standards to address maturity mismatch and stabilize deleveraging, make regulations 
countercyclical by promoting additional capital buffers and further reduce risk of largest 
international banks by imposing additional loss absorbency requirement. 
Countercyclical capital conservation buffer value lies in range from 0 to 2.5% depending 
on macroeconomic situation. Up to 2.5% of additional loss absorbency is required to be hold by 
systemically important banks
3
. 
The table 1 compares minimum capital requirements of Basel II and Basel III, which will 
fully come into force in 2019. 
Table 1. Comparison of Basel II and Basel III (with capital conservation buffer) requirements 
 Basel II Basel III 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 2% 7% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 4% 8.5% 
Total Capital Ratio 8% 10.5% 
Discussion of benefits and costs of Basel III 
Bank’s capital regulations are an object of heated debates between regulators and bankers 
during years following introduction of Basel III. While regulators believe it to be an appropriate 
way to reduce social costs of high leverage and increase financial system stability, banker argue 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix 1 for list of banks and additional capital requirements. 
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that expensive equity financing will lead to lending rates increase and slow GDP growth. Some 
analysts also emphasize that new capital requirements will lead to reduction of ROE for the 
average bank by 4 percentage points in Europe (Härle et al., 2010). However ROE is calculated 
dividing net income by total equity, so it cannot take into account the risk of company’s equity. 
Company can increase ROE by increasing leverage, but the risk will also increase. These 
changes in ROE do not reflect banks performance clearly as investors anticipate higher returns 
for higher risk. Thus pure ROE argument is not valid and corrected for risk ROE should be 
analyzed. This section summarizes results of studies on costs and benefits of new regulations for 
the economy. 
Crises, if occur, cause significant damage to the economy. Mark Adelson (2013) estimate 
total losses of the recent financial crisis to be between $5 trillion and $15 trillion. He sees 
excessive leverage and risk-taking behavior of financial firms to be main causes of the crisis. 
Enhanced capital regulations should decrease probability of financial crises occurrence in the 
future and reduce its severity. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) estimate that financial crisis lead, on 
average, to 10% reduction of GDP where 2.5% is permanent. Analysis of financial crises history 
(Hoggarth, Reis, Suporta, 2001) shows that average crisis in high-income countries last 4.1 years 
and costs 20.7% of GDP. This suggests great benefit of new regulations if they will reach their 
goal. 
Researches show that increased capital requirements has ability to prevent crises. 
Probability of 2007 financial crisis in UK could have been reduced by 5 percentage points with 1 
percentage point increase in capital requirements and would have dropped tenfold with 8 pp 
capital increase (Barrell et al. 2009). Kato, Kobayashi and Saita (2010) estimate optimal level of 
capital and conduct cost-benefit analysis of raising capital and liquidity requirements. If liquidity 
level is relatively high, 0.1 percent point increase in capital ratio results in 0.655 percent point 
reduction in the probability of crisis. Mooij et al. (2013) follow previous authors’ methodology 
and explore the link between systemic banking crisis probability and leverage, controlling for 
liquidity and current account balance. According to their results the relationship between 
leverage ratio and crisis probability is nonlinear. Marginal impact of leverage on probability 
increase dramatically when leverage exceeds 92%. Higher equity can be considered as a 
substitute to bailout fund
4
. 
                                                          
4
 Insights by Stanford Business (September 1, 2010) Anat Admati: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive [Online] Available from: 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/anat-admati-why-bank-equity-not-expensive [Accessed 9th May 2015] 
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Some economists even believe current modifications in Basel requirements to be 
insufficient (Miles et al., 2012, Admati and Hellwig, 2013). They support the necessity of higher 
capital requirements but argue the required level of capital with Basel III to be insufficient to 
reach desired effect. Their argument is based on the shortcomings of current system of risk-
weighted assets calculation, which tend to underestimate actual risk of the bank. Their research 
proves optimal level of capital of 20% of risk-weighted assets or even 20% of total assets. 
Miles et al. (2012) study historical patterns of leverage and lending spreads in US and do 
not find any obvious dependence. While leverage was increasing during twentieth century, 
lending rate spreads did not have a decreasing trend. Nevertheless more precise econometric 
studies ((Cosimano and Hakura, 2011; Roger and Vlcek, 2011; Elliot, 2009; Elliot, 2010b; 
Angelini et al., 2011, EEAG, 2011, BCBS, 2010)) justify existence of positive relationship 
between capital ratios and interest rate margins. Kashyap et al. (2010) estimate long-run lending 
rates to increase by 25- 45 basis points for a 10 percentage-point increase in the capital 
requirement. Cosimano and Hakura (2011) expect smaller growth of lending rates under Basel 
III (by 16 basis point), to be accompanied by 1.3% fall in loan growth. Slovik and Cournède 
(2011) expect annual GDP growth to drop by 0.05-0.15 percentage points caused by larger 
interest spreads. 
Although funding costs and lending rates spreads are expected to grow after Basel III 
implementation their separate study reflec mostly private costs for banks and not total costs for 
the economy. It is noted by Stein (2010) and Admati et al. (2013) that to analyze consequences 
of new capital requirements adoption the total social benefits should be measured. While banks 
benefits from high leverage to crease liquidity they also tend to overproduce it increasing 
negative externalities. When costs and benefits for the whole economy are compared, 
conclusions changes significantly. 
Barrell et al. (2009) find positive impact of higher capital requirements on lending rates 
but the present value of higher capital ratios policy remains positive. Net benefits of new 
requirements reach its peak at additional 4 pp of capital. In Bank of England Financial Stability 
Report benefits and costs of higher capital requirements are compared for UK financial system. 
Authors find marginal benefit from additional capital which becomes insignificant only at capital 
level above 13% of risk-weighted assets. 
Marchesi et al. (2012) use Bank of England methodology to analyze macroeconomic 
impact of deleveraging on 7 EU member countries. Their findings support bankers’ predictions 
about funding costs and lending spreads as they are expected to increase by 2.67 bps and 5.57 
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bps for 1% change in minimum capital requirements correspondingly. Despite the increase in 
funding costs net benefits for the economy remain positive if capital requirements do not exceed 
14.5% of RWA. This result is in line with BIS (2010a) which reports net benefits to exceed 1% 
of annually output. Additional capital requirements can also reduce amplitude of business cycle, 
but results can be impaired if financial intermediation activities will shift to non-regulated sector. 
Several researches (Cosimano, Hakura, 2011, Kashyap et al., 2010) indicate the risk of 
shadow banking growth caused by new regulations. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) found 
connection between shadow banking development and Basel II and, as Basel III capital 
requirements are higher than its predecessor, the process might continue. The FSB (2011) 
defines “shadow banking system” as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the regular banking system”. Shadow banking system provides companies with 
alternative source of funding, but it is also a source of additional systemic risk as they are not 
subject to regulatory initiatives. Highly leverage shadow banking institutions are usually 
connected with traditional banks and used by them to avoid capital regulations. This 
interconnectedness with regulated financial companies, as well as liquidity and maturity risks are 
the main sources of concern associated with the growth of shadow banking. By the end of 2013 
marginal contribution of shadow banking to systemic risk was above 10% in US and Euro area 
and it tends to increase during periods of distress leading to further destabilization of the 
economy (IMF, 2014). Therefore in order Basel III to be efficient it may require to adopt 
additional regulations for shadow banking entities. 
  
10 
 
Chapter 2. Literature review 
Modigliani-Miller theorem 
Modigliani Miller (MM) theorem was developed in 1958 and originally consisted of two 
propositions under assumption of perfect financial markets. There are four fundamental 
assumptions defining MM framework: 
 Absence or neutrality of taxes; 
 Absence of capital market frictions, such as transaction costs, trade restrictions and 
bankruptcy costs; 
 Ability of firms and investors to lend and borrow at the same rate; 
 Firm financial policy reveals no information. 
Modigliani and Miller states that for any “class” of firms, the share price of a particular 
firm equals to expected income earned by the firm discounted by expected rate of return for this 
“class”. Then they introduce a firm using debt and equity financing and establish connection 
between market value of the firm, which equals to market value of all its securities, and capital 
structure. This connection is known as Modigliani-Miller Proposition I 
Proposition I: “market value of any firm (    is independent of its capital structure and is 
given by capitalizing its expected return ( ̅   at the rate    appropriate to its class” (Modigliani, 
Miller, 1958). It can be expressed as, 
   (     )  
 ̅ 
  
⁄ ,    – debt,    – equity. 
 ̅ 
  
⁄    . 
Proposition I equals to the statement that cost of capital is independent from capital 
structure, which means      , where    is a market value of levered firm and    is the market 
value of unlevered company. 
The proof of this proposition is based on the non-arbitrage condition stating that market 
values of two identical assets should be the same. They compare strategy of buying percent P of 
equity of levered firm and buying percent P of shares of unlevered company borrowing percent P 
of levered company’s debt. As both strategies create the same income there is no difference in 
price of levered and unlevered company’s shares. 
Original second proposition of the theorem connected return of the firm’s share, expected 
rate of return for the “class” of firms and leverage of the company. 
Proposition II: “the expected yield of a share (  ) of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate    for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to financial 
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risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between    and r” (Modigliani, Miller, 
1958). 
            
  
  
, r – interest rate on debt 
It means that cost of equity will grow proportionally to leverage increase. This equation 
particularly reflects that investors require higher compensation for higher risk associated with 
leverage. 
In their later work they correct initial results for tax level. As interest rate payments on 
taxes are usually deductible from taxable income they may create additional value for the firm. 
Therefore in the universe with taxes, other things equals, firm’s value will increase the following 
way: 
        , 
Where   – tax rate and    represents the value of the tax shield. 
Correcting for taxes Modigliani and Miller obtain the following formula for equity yield: 
     
          
    
  
  
, 
Where   
  – capitalization rate for after tax income,   – tax rate. 
Presence of taxes reduces reaction of equity cost to changes in leverage but general 
tendency remains unchanged: equity cost continue increase with increase in leverage. This result 
of Modigliani-Miller theorem is fundamental for our further empirical study as we would attempt 
to quantify the effect of decreasing bank leverage on cost of equity and total costs of capital. 
Limitations of MM theorem 
Modigliani-Miller theorem is the most widely used theoretical framework to assess 
changes in the cost of equity due to leverage. However its initial assumptions does not hold in 
the real world, so theoretical papers focus on evaluating the consequences of market frictions for 
MM conclusions. For our literature review on the debates of MM relevance for banking the 
assumptions listed above will also be the starting point. 
First of all it is important to note that Modigliani-Miller worked on productive firm 
example and some researchers and bankers believe bank’s unique nature of activity to be the 
cause of irrelevance of MM theorem for banks. Economists suppose that high leverage has 
different meaning for banks and tend to separate them in analysis from non-financial firms
5
. 
Therefore question we need to answer is: “To what extend this theorem can be applied to 
financial companies in modern “imperfect” world?” If the theorem holds true, new regulations 
                                                          
5
 Fama E.F., French K.R. (1992) The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance. 47 (2). p. 427-
465. 
12 
 
will push down return on equity reducing or completely eliminating impact of increased share of 
equity financing on total funding costs. MM cannot specify an optimal capital level for financial 
or any sector of the economy, but it is a useful instrument to understand nature of relationship 
between leverage and cost of capital. 
There is still no agreement in academic researches on relevance of MM theorem to 
banking. Miller (1995) gives ambiguous answer on the question whether Modigliani-Miller 
theorem can be applied to banks. Kashyap et al. (2010) find that pure form of MM does not hold 
for banks, but conclude that small Modigliani-Miller effect is still significant and changes in cost 
of capital caused by a decrease of leverage are much smaller than expected. Most likely that pure 
MM irrevelance theorem does not hold not only for banks, but for any firm in the real economy 
(Pfleiderer, 2015). 
The first assumption about absence or neutrality of taxes does not hold in practice. Debt 
provides taxation benefit as interest payments, contrary to dividends, are deductible from taxable 
income creating a “tax shield”. Therefore high leverage is beneficial for both financial and non-
financial companies. Cheng and Green (2008) conduct study of 129 European companies and 
show significant but small impact of corporate tax rate on leverage. They conclude that 10% 
increase in corporate tax rate would raise leverage in most countries by less than 1%. Results 
vary considerably among countries with a maximum reaction of 3.4% in UK and a minimum of 
0.15% in Ireland. Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) find that the similar increase in tax rate 
increases debt-to-asset ratio by more than 1.4 pp. Gordon and Lee (2000) show that small and 
large firms’ capital decisions are most sensitive to tax rate changes. They estimate that 10 
percentage points increase of the corporate tax rate causes debt financing to grow by 3.6% of 
assets. Stein (2010) confirms existence of fiscal benefits of debt, as previous authors did, but his 
results imply it has little impact on cost of capital. 
Real financial markets are imperfect. They do not provide similar and full information for 
all participants and tend to over- or underestimate securities. This imperfection can make raising 
more equity inefficient and harmful for companies. Cosimano and Hakura (2011) find that 
changes in loan growth under the Basel III depend significantly on net cost of raising equity 
(return on equity relative to the marginal cost of deposits), which vary from 0 in Canada to 26 
basis points in Japan.  
On charts 1 and 2 we can see equity issuance statistics for Euro area. 
13 
 
Figure 1. Total net issues of shares in Euro area (% of 
GDP) 
 
Source: ECB 
Figure 2. Net issues of shares of financial companies in  
Euro area (% of GDP) 
 
 
On the chart above we can notice low levels of equity issues in Euro area compared to 
GDP. Banks managers are reluctant to issue new equity as they consider it to be undervalued. 
New equity issuance would be considered by market as a negative signal. Admati et al. (2013) 
suggest government not only to set capital standards, but also to set schedule of equity issuance 
so investors won’t consider new equity bearing negative information about banks performance. 
Market participants also may underestimate changes due to capital structure modifications and 
misprice securities (Pfleiderer, 2015). 
High leverage increase probability of bankruptcy which is associated with specific 
bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs involve costs associated with legal resolution process, loss of 
potential revenues and reputation losses. There is empirical evidence that bankruptcy costs are 
significant for both financial and nonfinancial companies. According to estimations these costs 
are in the range of 10-30 per cent (James, 1991, Andrade & Kaplan, 1998, Korteweg, 2010). 
Glover (2014) finds the mean default cost to be 45% of firm value, which empirical studies of 
defaulted firms produce cost of only 25%. As higher cost of default decrease net benefits of 
banks activity they will tend to choose less leverage to mitigate this effect. 
Debt funding can produce agency benefits. There are several views on agency costs. It 
may represent the benefit of debt, as banks management fears the prospect of deposits 
withdrawal and high leverage may actually improve management quality.  
“Debt is valuable in a bank’s capital structure because it provides an important 
disciplining force for management.” (French et al. 2010) 
As too much equity capital increase agency problem Calomiris & Herring (2011) propose 
supplementary contingent capital requirement in the form of convertible debt. It can be 
converted if the trigger event occurs and immediately improve bank capitalization and prevent 
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agency problem from occurrence during relatively stable periods. Authors prove their solution to 
be a cheaper way to prevent banks failure and resolve too-big-to-fail problem.  
The last two characteristics are specific for banks business model and product 
characteristics and may be the major causes why MM theorem is inapplicable for them. 
Banks prefer debt to equity because, by doing so they profit from implicit government 
guarantees. There are guarantees for the liability side of bank’s balance sheet in form of deposit 
insurance or to the asset side in the form of too-big-to-fail policy. Aboura and Lepinette (2015) a 
theoretical model of banks behavior in presence of debt guarantees by modeling guarantees as a 
free put option on banks debt provided by government to banks’ bondholders. They introduce the 
notion of “guaranteed firm” as an opposition to “classical firm in standard Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem and conclude that “guaranteed firm” benefits from leverage. While guarantees are free, 
as government guarantees to banking sector MM does not hold. To maintain MM applicability to 
the banking sector guarantees should be sold. However nonbank financial firms that do not profit 
from deposit insurance are also characterized by high leverage (Herring, 2011). While the 
median ratio of leverage of nonfinancial companies is 3.0, it is above 12 for both bank and 
nonbank financial companies. Therefore it can be suggested that low capital ratio of banks is 
associated with fundamental characteristics of banking industry product. 
Banks provide to clients 2 types of service: lending to those, who want to borrow, and 
socially valuable liquid financial claims for whose, who want to ensure sufficient liquidity 
during shocks. Mitchell Berlin (2011) says: “since liquid liabilities are a primary output of the 
banking firm, we should expect banks to be highly levered”. DeAngelo and Stulz (2013) study 
leverage importance for banks in absence of imperfections. As MM does not include for liquid 
assets creation it cannot reflect banks value. They construct model including liquidity premium 
and conclude that liquidity creation activities require high capital. Authors conclude that banks 
produce liquidity by making capital choices; therefore they will prefer debt to equity even in the 
absence of taxes and other above mentioned frictions. Lower leverage becomes optimal only 
when market premium on liquidity increases. 
Previously studied papers focused mostly on the effect of market frictions and increasing 
capitalization on private benefits of banks. But wellbeing of individual banks is not the goal of 
financial regulations. By introducing new requirements financial authorities analyze its benefits 
for the whole economy. Admati et al. (2013) and Vickers (2012) point out that social cost is the 
only factor that matters in the discussion of new regulations implementation. For example, while 
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bailout reduces private cost associated with debt as borrowers do not bear losses in case of banks 
insolvency it affects social costs Vickers (2012). 
Admati et al. (2013) state that high leverage is not necessary conditional of banking 
operations and deleveraging may be costly for individual banks or their managers, but beneficial 
to the whole economy. They distinguish eight widely used reasons why banks would remain 
leveraged and prove them all to be wrong from the point of view of benefits for the economy. 
They confirm that banks do not have individual optimal leverage ratio higher than socially 
optimal. It means that once the leverage is in place and banks creditors does not have concerns 
about its level it would continue to increase beyond optimal bounds. 
Tax benefits are a significant incentive to hold more debt. But taxes do not disappear 
from banks revenues in vain, they remains in the economy and are transferred to create 
additional social benefits. Similarly to taxes bailout guarantees that provoke banks to excessive 
risk taking and provide marginal benefits have not the same influence to the economy, as require 
investing large funds to save banks and withdraw them from other socially beneficial activities. 
The higher debt may discipline managers, but they are less capable to maintain the same 
quality of monitoring while the debt increases. Depositors also not have enough incentives to 
perform monitoring as they are protected by government. Meanwhile high leverage may increase 
monitoring costs on the national and supranational level as more attentive government 
monitoring is required for highly leverage firms. 
Reliance on hybrid instrument, proposed by Calomiris & Herring (2011) cannot be 
optimal in Admanti et al. (2013) opinion as it uses ex post trigger so recapitalization will occur 
after the negative event strikes. 
Admati et al. (2013) provide only theoretical analysis, so their results might be interesting 
to prove using econometrical models to get more accurate proof and quantitative estimations. 
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Chapter 3. Empirical study methodology 
The purpose of this paper is to measure to what extent MM theorem hold for banks and if 
there are differences between countries in terms of leverage influence on cost of capital. To 
verify Modigliani-Miller theorem applicability we start from calculating beta measure of 
systematic risk and study relationship between banks capital structure and beta. 
CAPM and systematic risk measure
6
 
Traditional CAPM model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) is one of the most widely used 
model of capital assets pricing. According to this model investors receive compensation for risk 
and time value of money and cost of capital can be calculated as: 
                     , 
Where       – return on asset,    – risk free rate of return, representing time value of 
money,    – market return,    – asset’s beta, measure of systematic risk. 
Statistically beta measure can be defined as: 
   
   
  
 , 
Where     is the covariance between stock return and market return and   
  is the 
variance of market return. 
The CAPM model does not take into account unsystematic risk as it is assumed efficient 
market and all specific risks can be diversified. It also assumes normal distribution of returns and 
possibility of riskless borrowings. 
CAPM model assumptions are strict, but CAPM provides reliable estimations and widely used 
by practitioners (Estrada, 2007; Graham and Harvey, 2001, Bruner et al., 1998), especially in 
developed markets. It is also used by Federal Reserve System to assess banks level of risk (King, 
2009).  
The beta of a portfolio represents weighted average of individual assets betas. Taking into 
account this notion and Modigliani-Miller proposition I for company we decompose firm assets 
beta the following way: 
 
   
   
 
   
     , 
Where    – beta of debt,    – beta of equity,    – assets beta of the unlevered firm. 
We consider banks being able to borrowings to be riskless, so     . Assuming that 
       we can get the new equation: 
   
 
   
   or 
                                                          
6
 This section is based on Brealey, R.A., Myers, S.C. & Allen, F. (2010) Principles of corporate finance. The 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin series in finance, insurance, and real estate. 10
th
 Edition.  
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  . 
   
 
 is leverage of the company, so beta expected to increase with the leverage. By this 
equation we establish the link between CAPM model and Modigliany-Miller theorem and 
supports linear relationship between beta and leverage. 
The model 
In this research we use extended, compared to previous similar studies, sample of banks 
from Eurozone, UK and US. We try to cross-country difference in reaction of banks risk to 
changes in leverage. 
First step is to obtain beta, according to CAPM model. We build simple linear regression 
model and regress daily stock returns of each of selected banks on the daily returns of 
corresponding market index over a period of six months using OLS method. This estimation is 
also known as Scholes-Williams equity beta. 
           
Six months period is chosen as banks mostly report data on capital semi-annually and this 
frequency enables us to analyze betas over similar periods for all banks.  
As was stated in the previous section beta also depends on company’s leverage. 
Therefore to reveal relationship between beta and leverage we construct panel data regression 
where beta is the dependent variable: 
       
     
       
          , 
Where    is a bank specific effect,    
  is a vector of regressors,   
  - vector of dummy 
variables. 
We include time dummies in the form of year dummy to capture common influence on all 
banks betas over time, for example financial crisis. We use 2014 as a reference year for time 
dummies.We also add Basel II and Basel III dummy, equals 1 for observations after 2008 and for 
observations in 2014 correspondingly. We expect these variables to capture the effect of changed 
capital definitions and increased requirements. 
We would analyze panel data using three methods: OLS estimation, fixed effects (FE) 
model and random effects (RE) model which enable us to take into account unobserved effects 
or unobserved heterogeneity. In fixed effects model parameter    is treated as random variable as 
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a specific to the bank parameter. Estimated value of    is constant and different for each bank in 
the sample. Fixed effect    can be correlated with    . Random effects model suppose that    is a 
random variable. It accounts for time- and company-specific characteristics of the bank. RE 
model is consistent when        ,      . If consistency condition for RE model is met the RE 
model should be preferred as it avoid loss of degrees of freedom and therefore is more efficient 
than FE estimation. 
Next we move to quantifying the impact of leverage on funding cost of the bank. We 
determine the cost of bank’s funds as weighted-average cost of capital: 
       
 
 
   
 
 
, 
Where company’s value V=E+D (E – value of equity, D – value of debt).    – estimated return 
on equity.  
As we already mentioned, we consider debt risk to be zero due to character of banks debt 
and existence of implied guarantees, thus interest rate of debt (  ) equals risk-free rate (   . 
   is estimated from CAPM model and obtained results for panel data regression. We 
can express    the following way: 
          ̂   ̂                      , 
Where  ̂ is the coefficient before leverage estimated in panel regression,            – 
market risk premium. 
Market risk premium is not just a simple excessive return of market index but a reflection 
of market participants’ estimation of risk and price of risk they want to receive. We will use 
consensus estimate for equity premium made by Ivo Welch
7
 (2008). This estimate reflects 
opinion of 400 US and foreign to US finance professors on 1-year and 30-year risk premium. 
The recommended range for market risk premium is from 4% to 6%. Updated research states 
that financial professionals lowered their estimations by 0.6%-0.7% from 2001. Considering this 
information we would use market risk premium of 5 %, which is similar to the value used by 
Miles et al. (2012). As the level of risk free rate has no critical influence on results we decide to 
follow Miles et al. (2012) and choose risk free rate equal to 5%. 
                                                          
7
 Update of the original Welch, I. (2001), The equity premium consensus forecasts revisited, Cowles Foundation, 
Discussion Paper No. 1325 
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The cost of capital can be adjusted for taxes by multiplying second component by    
  . We use information on marginal tax for corresponding region provided by KPMG8: 21% for 
UK, 40% for US and 30.3% for sample EU countries. 
Data 
In our empirical study we use data on 21 largest listed banks from Eurozone, UK and 
USA
9
. Our definition of banks size is based on banks’ book asset value and the list is formed 
using SNL Financial rank “Largest 100 banks in the world10” and historical total assets values 
reported by banks. Using semi-annually financial reports available at Capital IQ database and 
daily stock prices and index values data from Bloomberg we from an unbalanced panel dataset 
over the period from 2006:1H to 2014:2H.  
The use of limited number of companies is justified by the structure of banking industry 
where several largest banks control major part of banking industry assets in the region. Table 2 
presents share of sample banks’ assets compared to total industry assets and size of the sample 
compared to the size of the industry. For each region banks selected for the purpose of this 
research represent more than 40% of total banking industry assets while the sample includes less 
than 1% of companies in the industry. Such selection method may make RE effect approach for 
panel regression more suitable. 
Table 2. Concentration of banking assets in the sample banks (2014) 
Region Share of sample banks assets in 
total banks assets 
Share of sample in total 
number of banks 
Eurozone 41.5% 0.2% 
UK 72.1% 1.1% 
US 43.7% 0.1% 
The dependent variable in our regression analysis is banks equity beta. The inputs to the 
initial beta regression are daily stock returns calculated from daily stock prices and daily returns 
of corresponding regional market index. In our analyzed we have chosen following indices: 
FTSE 100 for UK, S&P 500 for US and STOXX Europe 600 for Euro area. 
The primary explanatory variable is leverage. We use regulatory leverage measure 
calculated as Total assets/Tier 1 capital which is not affected by the method of risk-weighted 
                                                          
8
 KPMG. Corporate tax rates table. [Online] Accessed 20
th
 May 2015. Available from: 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx 
9
 Full list of sample banks is found in Appendix 2. 
10
 SNL Financial rank “Largest 100 banks in the world” (December 23, 2013) . [Online] Available from: 
https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-26316576-11566 [Acceded 10
th
 May 2015] 
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assets calculation. We also examine the possible use of Tier 1 capital ratio i.e. Tier 1 
capital/Risk-weighted assets. However we have several concerns regarding this measure. Tier 1 
ratio is not completely comparable over time as definition of both Tier 1 ratio and RWA changed 
significantly over time. It has also shown upward trend during studied period that may cause 
misleading coefficient values. Finally, there is no theoretically proved connection between cost 
of equity and Tier 1 ratio, so leverage seems to be more appropriate for this type of study. 
We add bank specific independent variable to capture specific risks: liquidity proxy and 
profitability proxy. Loan-to-deposit ratio is used as a proxy of liquidity to represents the maturity 
transformation activities of the bank. Loan-to-deposit ratio generally has no upper limit. If the 
ratio is equals or above 100% loans are funded by borrowing and banks have shortage of cash in 
case of contingency. 
Profitability is expected to have an influence on overall risk of the bank. Miles et al. 
(2012) suggest using ROA as a profitability measure, but in their result for a subset of largest 
UK banks this variable is insignificant. Furthermore, using DuPont decomposition of ROE we 
can get         
      
            
, so we can expect ROA to be correlated with capital ratio and 
leverage. However we include ROA in the list of bank specific variable for further study. 
The lagged values of leverage, ROA and liquidity are used in the model to address 
potential endogeneity. In table 4 presented the correlation matrix for leverage and independent 
variables. There is no excessive correlation between regressors used in our analysis. Contrary to 
expectations, correlation between ROA and leverage does not exceed acceptable level and even 
if it is the highest compared to others we can use it for the purpose of analysis. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
  Tier 1 ratio ROA LTD Leverage 
Tier 1 ratio 1 
      
ROA -0.1122 1     
LTD -0.2877 -0.1435 1   
Leverage -0.2312 -0.3192 0.0012 1 
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Chapter 4. Estimation results 
Mean and median betas of banks in our sample are generally higher than 1, meaning that 
banks stock prices are more volatile than corresponding market index. 
Table 4. Mean and median beta values for studied regions and the whole sample for the period 2006-2014 
 Mean Median 
US 1.457 1.324 
UK 1.405 1.289 
Eurozone 1.563 1.522 
Total 1.487 1.414 
Evolution of beta through time also shows similarities between countries. There is a sharp 
increase of beta during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, most evident in UK and US, followed 
by a fast return to pre-crisis level in 2010. Another significant increase corresponds to Cypriot 
financial crisis which had more effect on Eurozone and UK banks. Beta values also show 
upward trend over 9 years studied with average beta in 1H2006 of 1.10 and in 2H2014 already 
reached 1.28. This trend is more evident in Euro area with average beta increased by 44% over 9 
year period. 
Figure 3.Comparison of median sample betas between regions (2006-2014) 
 
Table 5 and appendix 4 present descriptive statistics for the whole sample of 21 banks 
and for each of three regional subsamples. The leverage measure shows higher variation 
compared to Tier 1 capital ratio, which can partially be explained by higher variation of Total 
assets compared to Risk-weighted assets variation. It may also be more capable to capture 
changes in beta values over time. We can also notice an outstandingly high maximum value of 
loans-to-deposits ratio which corresponds to Euro area subsample.  
0
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Beta 
1.487 0.459 3.520 0.485 1.160 1.414 1.764 0.326 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.106 0.041 0.173 0.023 0.086 0.109 0.123 0.214 
Leverage 
25.795 10.540 74.570 12.258 16.685 22.380 30.949 0.475 
ROA 
0.002 -0.018 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 1.627 
LTD 
1.043 0.439 5.923 0.414 0.785 1.003 1.188 0.397 
Bank specific variables are close among regional subsamples, but there are several 
outstanding values. The Euro area leverage indicator is two times higher than median leverage in 
US and slightly higher than UK mean leverage. This is in line with higher beta values typical for 
Euro zone. UK banks profitability is 1.5 times higher than profitability in the peer regions. These 
geographic location specific characteristics can have significant impact on beta reaction to 
leverage.  
We conduct Fisher type unit root test for panel data on beta, Tier 1 capital ratio and 
leverage to verify that panel is stationary. Fisher type unit root test is based on Dickey-Fuller unit 
root test. The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit roots. For both beta and leverage the 
null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots can be rejected at 5% significance level. 
Therefore we suppose that beta and leverage are trend stationary and will use leverage as an 
explanatory variable in the regression. For Tier 1 capital ratio the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at 10% significance level, which means that it is not trend stationary. 
We estimate two models: basic regression model, which involves only leverage and time 
dummies as explanatory variables, and extended model involving additional bank specific 
variables. We conduct Hausman test to choose between FE and RE models. The null hypothesis 
of the test is that both FE and RE are consistent. In case when the null hypothesis is not rejected 
we should chose RE model as it provides more efficient estimations. For our total sample the 
null hypothesis of Hausman test is not rejected so we conclude that RE fits data the best. This 
result contradicts with Miles et al. (2012) where authors conclude FE to be the most suitable 
estimation method. 
Results of regression analysis on the total sample (Table 6) are not completely consistent 
with previous studies (Miles et al., 2012, Bandt et al.). The coefficient estimate on leverage is 
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positive and significant for OLS and RE estimations. However this coefficient is it is 
insignificant for FE estimation which contradicts with existing literature. Miles et al. (2012) 
finds RE and OLS leverage coefficient of 0.025, while in our analysis it is more than 2 times 
smaller. We also find significant impact of lagged value of ROA and loans-to-deposits ratio on 
beta. Addition of these bank specific characteristics produces marginal increase in R-squared, 
but significantly decrease leverage coefficient estimations. We suppose that these differences of 
our results from evidences presented in existing literature are caused by significant time-varying 
banks specific characteristics. 
Table 6. Results for OLS, FE and RE estimation of basic and extended model for the whole sample 
 Basic model Extended model 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Leverage .0103539 .0028292 .0082816 .0053481 .0016728 0.0049453 
 (5.68) (0.58) (2.74) (2.84) (0.36) (1.79) 
Const .791305 1.031061 .8722454 1.076225 .984335 0.9867516 
 7.33 (6.21) (6.76) (7.55) (4.76) (6.00) 
ROA    -47.4143 -42.90171 -44.10746 
    (-6.69) (-5.51) (-5.96) 
LTD    .0933865 .2701716 0.1855195 
    (1.50) (2.75) (2.33) 
R
2
 overall 0.3642 0.3324 0.3621 0.4527 0.4273 0.4484 
R
2
 between     0.3938 0.5008 
R
2
 within     0.4388 0.4363 
F-test/Wald 
test 
21.26 20.40 192.55 24.96 22.18 261.43 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
We suppose that estimation of separate regressions for each region should give better 
resulted and a second step we perform similar regression analysis for each geographic subsample 
separately. The results we get (Appendix 5) show significant differences from previously 
estimated regression and are more consistent with existing literature.  
For all subsamples Hausman test results show that RE model is more suitable. We obtain 
leverage coefficients of 0.011721 for Euro area, .031383 for UK and 0.0660654 for US. Miles et 
al. (2012) FE estimation of the same coefficient for UK  
In our estimations leverage coefficient for the sample of UK banks is 0.026, while 
according Miles et al. (2012) is equals 0.031. The loans-to-deposits ratio is significant only in the 
panel for Euro area. Mean LTD for the sample of European banks exceeds 1, which implies that 
they are systematically borrowing to expand lending activities. Therefore we might suggest that 
banks systematic risk reacts only to extremely high levels of LTD and constant shortage of cash. 
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Contrary to Miles et al. (2012) results ROA appears to be significant in all subsample 
regressions. However introduction of additional independent variable does not result in 
significant increase of explanatory power of regressions. 
All specifications include year effect that are significant especially in periods of financial 
instability and reflect overall changes in risk perception by investors. 
We rerun our models to check for Basel II and Basel III implementation impact of beta. 
In all cases coefficients before both regulatory changes variables are insignificant, which does 
not mean that they did not affected betas. As their effect on beta is translated through leverage 
ratio the implementation of new regulatory framework itself does not change market participants 
models of firm risk assessment. 
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Chapter 5. Measurement of leverage influence on total cost of capital 
To assess the impact of leverage on cost of equity we will use result from simple RE 
panel model estimation and average leverage level for each subsample during 2014.  
Table 7. Cost of equity estimation  
 Euro area UK US 
Average leverage  25.7902 20.9697 12.5233 
 ̂ 0.9378 0.4288 0 
 ̂ 0.0117 0.0314 0.0660 
Cost of equity (no taxes) 11.198% 10.436% 9.133% 
WACC (no taxes) 5.24% 5.26% 5.33% 
Cost of equity (with taxes) 9.360% 9.685% 8.165% 
WACC (with taxes) 3.72% 4.22% 3.41% 
Now we suppose the case of doubling capital, therefore leverage will be halved. The 
results are presented in table 8. The cost of equity with taxes is calculated using Hamada 
equation:                     
  
  
. 
Table 8. Changes in cost of equity and WACC if capital doubles. 
 Euro area UK US 
Average leverage  12.8951 10.4849 6.2617 
Cost of equity (no taxes) 10.443% 8.790% 7.066% 
Δ Cost of equty (no taxes) 0.755 pp -1.646 pp -2.067 pp 
WACC (no taxes) 5.42% 5.36% 5.42% 
Δ WACC (no taxes) 0.18 pp 0.10 pp 0.09 pp 
WACC (no taxes, no MM) 5.48% 5.52% 5.66% 
Δ WACC (no taxes, no MM) 0.24 pp 0.26 pp 0.33 pp 
MM offset (no taxes) 25% 61% 73% 
Cost of equity (with taxes) 8.700% 9.012% 7.706% 
WACC (with taxes) 3.97% 4.43% 3.75% 
Δ WACC (with taxes) 0.25 pp 0.21 pp 0.34 pp 
WACC (with taxes, no MM) 3.94% 4.50% 3.82% 
Δ WACC (with taxes, no MM) 0.22 pp 0.28 pp 41 pp 
MM offset (with taxes) -13% 25% 24% 
We can see that increase in leverage lead to increase in total cost of capital. Taking into 
account this results we cannot say that MM theorem hold perfectly for banks. However, if MM 
does not hold at all, cost of equity would be unaffected by changes in leverage and we would see 
higher increase in WACC. MM offset is calculated estimated change in WACC by comparing 
change in WACC if cost of equity remains constant with increasing leverage. It measures to 
what extent MM theorem holds for each region. Conforming to our expectations MM offset 
decreases with addition of taxes; however it remains positive in US and UK. Negative MM 
offset for Euro area suggests that there are extra frictions that affect banks cost of capital.  
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Conclusion 
Global economy endured severe losses during financial crisis. The necessity to reduce the 
probability of occurrence of such events in the future is obvious and demand to increase banks 
capitalization is one of possible means to address the problem. However there is still no 
agreement in the estimation private and social of costs associated with such requirement.  
MM theorem states that change in capital structure will not affects funding costs thus will 
have close to zero effect on banks activities. Nevertheless the theorem does not hold in pure form 
in reality due to existing market frictions. We conduct a panel regression analysis to confirm that 
MM theorem holds for banks in Euro area, UK and US over the period 2006-2014. We test the 
impact of leverage, liquidity and profitability of the bank on its risk. Afterwards we quantify an 
impact of changes in leverage on cost of capital through changing cost of equity and compare 
our result with hypothetical situation when cost of equity is not affected by changes in leverage. 
Evidences prove existence of significant differences in beta reaction to leverage changes among 
countries, thus the estimations should be conducted separately for individual countries or 
common currency areas. 
Our results conforms to MM proposition II and existing literature on the topic and beta 
increases when the leverage increases. The influence of liquidity and profitability on risk is less 
obvious, but we can suppose that increase in profitability has significant negative influence on 
risk, while liquidity determined as loans-to-deposits ratio is significant only if it reflects 
excessive lending activities of the bank. We also confirm that total funding costs would likely 
increase after new capital regulations adoption. The level of increase in WACC varies among 
countries from 0.09pp to 18pp for 50pp decrease in leverage. However it is smaller than 
expected under assumption of complete irrelevance of MM theorem. We conclude that there is a 
MM effect greater than 60% in UK and US, but only of 25% in Euro area. The MM diminishes 
significantly if taxes are included in the model, but as they are not the losses for the economy, so 
the more in-depth analysis of costs and benefits is required to make conclusions about model 
with taxes. 
While deleveraging may not solve all banking system problems it is capable to reduce 
risk of individual bank as well as risk of default for the economy. As a further development of 
studies in this area we would like to suggest cross-country analysis of leverage influence on beta 
and analysis of larger set of banks specific and country specific variables to explain the origins 
of difference in banks risk reaction to leverage. 
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Appendix 1. List of global systemically important banks
11
 
Bank name Additional loss 
absorbency 
Country 
Agricultural Bank of China 1.0% 
China Bank of China 1.0% 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 1.0% 
BNP Paribas 2.0% 
France 
 
Groupe BPCE 1.0% 
Group Crédit Agricole 1.0% 
Société Générale 1.0% 
Deutsche Bank 2.0% Germany 
Unicredit Group 1.0% Italy 
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 1.5% 
Japan 
 
Mizuho FG 1.0% 
Sumitomo Mitsui FG 1.0% 
ING Bank 1.0% Netherlands 
BBVA 1.0% 
Spain 
Santander 1.0% 
Nordea 1.0% Sweden 
Credit Suisse 1.5% 
Switzerland 
UBS 1.0% 
HSBC 2.5% 
UK 
Barclays 2.0% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 1.5% 
Standard Chartered 1.0% 
JP Morgan Chase 2.5% 
USA 
Citigroup 2.0% 
Bank of America 1.5% 
Goldman Sachs 1.5% 
Morgan Stanley 1.5% 
Bank of New York Mellon 1.0% 
State Street 1.0% 
Wells Fargo 1.0% 
 
  
                                                          
11
 Source: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141106b.pdf 
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Appendix 2. Sample of banks studied 
Bank  Total assets, EUR million, 
2014 
Country 
BNP Paribas 2 077 759 France 
Natixis 590 424 France 
Group Crédit Agricole 1 589 076 France 
Société Générale 1 308 170 France 
Deutsche Bank 1 708 703 Germany 
Commerzbank AG 557 609 Germany 
Unicredit Group 844 217.4 Italy 
ING Bank 992 856 Netherlands 
BBVA 631 942 Spain 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 646 427 Spain 
Santander 1 266 296 Spain 
KBC Group 245 174 Belgium 
Erste Group 196 287 Austria 
HSBC 2 400 095 UK 
Barclays 1 889 661.8 UK 
Lloyds Banking Group 854 896 UK 
Royal Bank of Scotland 1 462 241.6 UK 
Standard Chartered 661 416.5 UK 
JP Morgan Chase 2 344 503.8 USA 
Citigroup 1 678 821.2 USA 
Bank of America 1 917 546.2 USA 
US Bancorp 366 764.3 USA 
Wells Fargo 1 583 339.1 USA 
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Appendix 3. Beta estimation results 
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2H2014 1.28 1.30 1.36 1.32 1.19 1.53 1.43 1.25 0.97 1.00 1.05 0.72 1.15 0.95 0.87 1.25 0.86 0.92 1.25 0.61 0.76 1.28 1.24 
1H2014 1.55 1.15 1.61 1.33 1.55 1.37 0.94 1.39 1.25 0.84 1.30 0.86 1.22 0.87 0.93 1.42 0.74 0.93 1.28 0.46 0.65 1.36 1.33 
2H2013 1.27 1.06 1.22 1.22 1.30 1.21 1.00 1.01 1.30 0.92 1.26 0.56 1.38 0.81 0.92 1.23 0.98 1.22 1.24 0.70 1.07 1.45 1.42 
1H2013 1.35 1.78 1.23 1.41 1.13 1.38 1.46 0.88 0.65 0.71 0.62 0.84 1.52 1.13 1.50 1.42 1.14 1.42 1.41 1.20 1.34 1.37 1.34 
2H2012 1.39 1.49 1.56 1.38 1.23 1.83 0.97 1.46 0.71 0.89 0.67 0.97 1.61 1.39 1.77 1.40 1.61 2.13 1.63 1.14 1.78 1.93 1.87 
1H2012 1.18 1.50 1.52 1.28 1.75 1.58 1.55 2.11 0.94 1.35 0.99 0.93 1.50 1.24 1.53 1.63 1.91 1.92 1.50 1.12 1.42 1.90 2.09 
2H2011 2.21 1.71 1.91 1.79 2.24 2.06 2.01 2.86 1.38 1.62 1.47 1.89 3.14 3.19 2.67 1.87 3.52 3.22 2.57 2.29 3.20 1.86 2.02 
1H2011 1.45 1.65 1.55 1.42 1.68 1.87 1.59 2.34 1.02 1.37 1.09 1.36 1.72 1.18 1.82 1.38 1.63 1.56 1.63 1.44 1.65 1.23 1.17 
2H2010 1.68 1.79 1.61 1.79 1.47 1.05 1.95 2.34 1.67 1.85 1.73 0.93 2.18 1.91 1.84 1.46 1.52 1.47 1.30 1.09 1.36 1.54 1.57 
1H2010 1.77 1.57 1.94 2.05 1.29 0.96 1.55 1.92 1.36 1.64 1.43 1.01 1.73 1.58 1.58 1.25 1.73 1.43 1.41 1.49 1.68 1.62 1.67 
2H2009 1.35 1.16 1.35 1.47 1.21 1.26 1.40 1.60 1.17 1.64 1.12 0.93 1.16 1.06 1.11 1.00 1.23 1.13 1.17 1.10 1.22 1.54 1.56 
1H2009 2.20 1.97 2.20 2.63 1.98 2.17 1.94 2.35 1.25 2.13 0.99 1.15 2.33 2.02 2.05 1.27 2.04 2.08 1.55 1.31 1.46 2.33 2.21 
2H2008 2.10 2.13 2.25 2.47 1.85 2.09 2.54 2.45 1.32 2.25 1.14 1.15 2.19 2.02 1.97 1.36 2.35 2.23 1.53 1.15 1.42 1.45 1.50 
1H2008 2.27 2.41 2.79 2.63 2.33 2.15 2.43 2.10 1.85 2.48 1.56 1.29 2.24 1.71 1.85 1.26 1.75 1.87 1.44 0.98 1.19 1.38 1.40 
2H2007 1.85 1.06 1.89 2.04 1.63 0.60 1.72 1.70 1.08 1.76 1.10 1.26 1.67 1.15 1.34 1.19 1.37 1.60 1.20 0.68 0.96 1.21 1.34 
1H2007 1.57 1.42 1.63 1.99 1.30 1.85 1.73 1.78 1.17 1.81 1.13 1.18 1.20 1.34 1.59 1.46 1.41 1.50 1.30 0.92 1.16 1.09 1.21 
2H2006 1.51 1.45 1.57 1.82 1.37 1.86 2.06 1.68 1.53 1.83 1.19 0.91 1.21 1.06 1.33 1.04 0.97 1.24 1.11 0.91 0.95 1.12 1.22 
1H2006 1.36 1.52 1.47 1.62 1.31 1.43 1.89 1.55 1.10 1.84 1.15 1.02 1.29 0.99 1.17 0.71 1.09 1.24 1.17 1.00 0.97 1.10 1.15 
Mean 1.63 1.56 1.70 1.76 1.55 1.57 1.67 1.82 1.21 1.55 1.17 1.05 1.69 1.42 1.55 1.31 1.55 1.62 1.43 1.09 1.35   
Median 1.53 1.51 1.59 1.71 1.42 1.56 1.66 1.74 1.21 1.64 1.14 0.99 1.56 1.21 1.56 1.32 1.46 1.49 1.36 1.10 1.28   
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Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics for regional subsamples 
Table 5-1. Descriptive statistics for US banks 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Beta 
1.405 0.459 3.520 0.537 1.101 1.304 1.598 0.382 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.107 0.041 0.145 0.021 0.088 0.111 0.122 0.198 
Leverage 
14.232 10.540 24.516 2.746 12.232 13.889 15.166 0.193 
ROA 
0.004 -0.010 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.845 
LTD 
0.848 0.540 1.209 0.167 0.708 0.860 0.949 0.197 
Table 5-2. Descriptive statistics for UK banks 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Beta 
1.493 0.557 3.193 0.487 1.064 1.289 1.626 0.347 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.111 0.072 0.165 0.023 0.091 0.115 0.132 0.205 
Leverage 
25.018 15.054 55.114 8.089 21.850 19.356 22.697 0.323 
ROA 
0.0016 -0.0096 0.0067 0.0029 0.0005 0.0001 0.0019 1.791 
LTD 
0.959 0.693 1.500 0.200 0.916 0.785 0.913 0.209 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for Eurozone banks 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std 
Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Beta 
1.562 0.602 2.859 0.449 1.255 1.522 1.848 0.288 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.103 0.058 0.173 0.023 0.082 0.106 0.119 0.221 
Leverage 
31.798 14.710 74.570 12.650 21.850 27.940 40.340 0.398 
ROA 
0.001 -0.018 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 2.368 
LTD 
1.170 0.439 5.923 0.510 0.916 1.132 1.329 0.436 
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Appendix 5. Results for regressions on regional subsamples 
Table 6-1. Regression results for Eurozone 
 Basic model Extended model 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Leverage .0106194 .0125584 .0117216 .0130237 .0116369 .013042 
 (4.59) (2.41) (2.98) (4.79) (2.25) (4.75) 
Const .915629 .9071895 .9378093 .6961477 .7748831 .6960843 
 5.95 (4.22) (4.98) (3.16) (3.04) (3.16) 
ROA    -30.64969 -19.12501 -30.14166 
    (-3.21) (-2.04) (-3.16) 
LTD    .2324872 .2063705 .2322704 
    (2.94) (2.23) (2.93) 
R
2
 overall 0.4363 0.4334  0.4350 0.4725 0.4995 0.5061 
R
2
 between     0.4813 0.5088 
R
2
 within     0.5096   0.5041 
F-test/Wald 
test 
14.10 15.80 146.50 15.09 14.36 165.77 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 6-2. Regression results for UK 
 Basic model Extended model 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Leverage .032361 .0293488 .031383 .026848 .0275454 .0266976 
 (6.52) (2.94) (4.57) (4.95) (2.67) (3.35) 
Const .4082259   .4716329 .4288135 .5009388 .2964189 .3985193 
 (2.86) (2.05) (2.41) (2.42) (0.77) (1.33) 
ROA    -33.22446 -32.09105 -32.14603 
    (-2.20) (-1.86) (-1.96) 
LTD    .0483682 .2539332 .1623909 
    (0.31) (0.92) (0.73) 
R
2
 overall 0.5322 0.5310 0.5321 0.5584 0.5500 0.5558 
R
2
 between     0.7424 0.7638 
R
2
 within     0.4929 0.4923   
F-test/Wald 
test 
11.63 8.43 88.76 10.35 7.51 92.47 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 6-3. Regression results for US 
 Basic model Extended model 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Leverage .0755672 .0478889 .0660654 .0203527 .0010359 .0203527 
 (5.68) (1.65) (3.00) (0.86) (0.04) (0.86) 
Const -.4322357 .0227642 -.2760363 .7454311   -.1488607 .7454311 
 (-1.30) (0.05) (-0.70) (1.15) (-0.20) (1.15) 
ROA    -70.00285 -71.20025 -70.00285 
    (-4.63) (-4.00) (-4.63) 
LTD    .2824167 1.585878 .2824167 
    (0.92) (2.14) (0.92) 
R
2
 overall 0.6009 0.5890 0.5996  0.6941 0.5604 0.4484 
R
2
 between     0.0935 0.5008 
R
2
 within     0.6803 0.4363 
F-test/Wald 
test 
12.55 11.53 110.16 15.06 13.35 261.43 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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